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NOTE
SMITH V. SALISH KOOTENAI COLLEGE:
SELF-DETERMINATION AS GOVERNING
PRINCIPLE OR AFTERTHOUGHT IN TRIBAL
CIVIL JURISDICTION JURISPRUDENCE?
Nicole E. Ducheneaux*
The Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in Smith v. Salish Koote-
nai College,' while unquestionably a narrow victory for the Con-
federated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation,
is, when viewed more broadly, just another in a long line of cases
that misguidedly defines the boundary between state and tribal
civil adjudicatory power over civil actions arising on the reserva-
tion. In its 1959 decision Williams v. Lee, 2 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that constitutional principles, case precedents and
statutory law dictate a presumption in favor of inherent tribal ad-
judicatory power over activities occurring on the reservation. 3
The Court has never reversed its holding in Williams, and contin-
ues to nominally uphold it.4 Yet since its decision in Montana v.
* B.A. Fort Lewis College, 2003; candidate for J.D., University of Montana School of Law, May
2007. Thank you to Professor Ray Cross for his guidance and encouragement. I am so proud to be his
pupil. Thank you also to my forebears, those fighters and activists, who are my constant inspiration:
Ernestine Roullier Ducheneaux, Delores N. Roullier, Ellen Claymore Ducheneaux, and Frank
Ducheneaux I. Special thanks to my hero and Indian law mentor, Franklin D. Ducheneaux, without
whom I wouldn't be here (literally).
1. Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 434 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2006).
2. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
3. Id. at 220.
4. See Nev. v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438
(1997); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987); Natl. Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow
Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
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United States,5 the Court has consistently supported a proposition
opposite what it held in Williams-that there is instead a pre-
sumption in favor of state civil jurisdiction on the reservation, re-
lying on the theory of implicit divestiture of tribal sovereign au-
thority.6
This Comment will show that while the Williams rule-that
tribal courts possess inherent adjudicatory jurisdiction over reser-
vation-based causes of action regardless of land status or the sta-
tus of the parties-may have been rendered judicially obsolete, it
is still the presumption that best serves the basic principles of fed-
eral Indian law. It is a presumption that serves both Indian and
non-Indian interests by moving toward the current federal goal of
tribal self-determination. This presumption also enhances overall
judicial economy and provides for uniformity in judicial interpre-
tation of federal treaties, statutes, and executive orders.
This Comment will discuss the history of the Court's treat-
ment of the scope of inherent tribal authority over reservation-
based causes of action. Section I will address the foundations of
inherent tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction, highlighting the authori-
ties that support the Williams interpretation of the scope of tribal
jurisdiction. Section II will focus on Montana and its successors,
and how they, paradoxically, both moved away from the Williams
holding and solidified the principles that underlie the Williams
presumption. Section III will explore how the recent decision in
Smith v. Salish Kootenai College fits in this line of cases. Finally,
in Section IV, this Comment will assert the reasons why we
should return to the original Williams presumption, and how this
can be accomplished by either the Court or the U.S. Congress.
I. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, WLLIAMS, AND
THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF TRIBAL CIVIL ADJUDICATORY
POWER FOR ACTIONS ARISING ON THE RESERVATION
In 1959, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Williams v. Lee,7
which stands for the proposition that, except for limited circum-
stances, tribes retain the inherent sovereign power to adjudicate
civil matters arising on the reservation regardless of the status of
the parties.8 In Williams, a non-Indian owner of a general store
5. Mont. v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
6. Id. at 565-66.
7. Williams, 358 U.S. 217.
8. Id. at 220.
Vol. 68212
2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 68 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol68/iss1/10
TRIBAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
on the Navajo Indian Reservation brought an action in Arizona
state court to collect a debt owed him by a Navajo tribal member
and his wife. 9 The Indian defendants moved to dismiss the state
court action, arguing that the Navajo tribal court had jurisdiction
over the action.10 Both the Arizona trial court and the Arizona
Supreme Court held in favor of the store owner, on the grounds
that the state of Arizona had presumptive jurisdiction over civil
actions arising on the reservation absent an express act of Con-
gress to the contrary.11 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to decide under what circumstances states have civil adjudi-
catory authority over actions arising on the reservation.' 2
The Court addressed this question by examining the most ba-
sic principles of federal Indian law.1 3 Principally, the Court relied
on Worcester v. Georgia,14 Chief Justice John Marshall's seminal
Indian law decision, which first articulated the foundational tenet
of Indian law that, by virtue of their interaction with the United
States, tribes have a limited kind of sovereignty through which
they retain powers of self-government. 15 These inherent tribal
powers of self-government generally preclude states from exerting
adjudicatory authority in Indian Country.' 6 Reviewing over one
hundred years of Indian law jurisprudence, the Williams Court
stated that this bedrock principle of Indian law shields tribes from
state jurisdiction, a principle that has remained substantially in-
tact since 1832, except for limited circumstances in which "essen-
tial tribal relations were not involved and where the rights of Indi-
ans would not be jeopardized.' 7 Within that framework, the
Court articulated the clear rule that unless the U.S. Congress has
expressly stated otherwise, tribes exercise civil adjudicatory
power over reservation-based causes of action except when state
jurisdiction does not "infringe[ ] on the right of reservation Indi-
ans to make their own laws and be ruled by them."' 8 The Court
stated that such a rule was in agreement with Congress's "as-
9. Id. at 217-18.
10. Id. at 218.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 218-19.
14. Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
15. Id. at 520.
16. Williams, 358 U.S. at 219.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 220.
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sumption that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of
Indians on a reservation."19
After examining the scope of federal statutes and the Navajo
Tribe's treaties with the U.S. government, the Court held that this
reservation-based cause of action, involving a non-Indian plaintiff
and Indian defendants, could not fall under state jurisdiction be-
cause it would "undermine the authority of the tribal courts over
Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the
Indians to govern themselves."20 The Court did not qualify its
holding based on party status or the nature of the cause of action.
It called the plaintiffs non-Indian status "immaterial"; the dispos-
itive factors were that the plaintiff was located "on the Reserva-
tion and the transaction with an Indian took place there."21
There are two conflicting policies at issue in this opinion, each
emanating from a distinct era of federal Indian policy. First, the
Court viewed Marshall-era tribal sovereignty principles as having
modern justification in the New Deal's conception of Indian self-
determination. 22 As the Court noted, during the New Deal era,
federal Indian policy shifted from centralizing federal control over
Indian affairs to using federal resources to promote stronger, more
organized tribal governments and tribal courts. 23 To the Williams
Court, this federal policy goal of supporting tribal self-government
solidified the legal basis for its conclusion that the Court must
presume tribal civil adjudicatory authority on the reservation.24
Second, since the opinion was written in 1959, it was in-
formed by termination-era theories that tribes as separate and
distinct political entities must be functionally destroyed in order
to integrate Indian people into mainstream society.25 But this
policy consideration did not detract from the Court's finding of
presumptive tribal civil jurisdiction. Rather, the Court used ter-
mination policy, which contemplated eliminating tribes com-
pletely by act of Congress and surrendering full civil and criminal
jurisdiction to the states,26 to reason that tribes retain all those
19. Id.
20. Id. at 223.
21. Id. at 223.
22. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. David H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson & Robert A. Williams Jr., Cases and
Materials on Federal Indian Law 206-07 (5th Ed., West 2005); Nell Jessop Newton, Co-
hen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law 89-91 (Lexis 2005).
26. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
214 Vol. 68
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powers not expressly divested by Congress. In this case, no act of
Congress had terminated the Navajo Tribe, hence Arizona had no
civil adjudicatory power on that reservation.27
The opinion, written by Justice Black, appears to be unambig-
uous. The scope of tribal civil adjudicatory authority had evolved
little since Chief Justice Marshall's time. State authority over
reservation-based causes of action comes into being only where
there is no impact on, or overlap with, tribal self-government.
Status of the parties is immaterial. It is whether the cause of ac-
tion arose on the reservation that is dispositive of tribal jurisdic-
tion. Reiterating a fundamental principle of federal Indian law,
the Court stated that tribal sovereign power to adjudicate reserva-
tion-based civil actions remains vested in the tribes, and "[iif this
power is to be taken away from them, it is for the Congress to do
it."28
Despite the seeming clarity of this short opinion, courts and
scholars have interpreted Williams differently. Some authorities
have interpreted Williams as supporting a presumption in favor of
tribal civil adjudicatory authority, as it is interpreted above, 29 es-
pecially when viewed through the originalist or the foundational-
ist lens. 30 Gloria Valencia-Weber, law professor at the University
of New Mexico, has examined colonial relations between the tribes
and the crown, early American concepts of land and government,
the Articles of Confederation, the origins of the Constitution and
federal Indian law jurisprudence to conclude that the Founders,
like Justice Black in Williams, saw little if any role for the state in
Indian Country, leaving inherent adjudicatory authority with the
tribes. 31
Other authorities treat the Williams holding as more specific.
Significantly, the Court in Montana v. United States32 cited Wil-
liams as a primary source for the Montana exceptions. 33 In that
case, the Court circumscribed inherent tribal adjudicatory author-
ity, prohibiting tribal civil regulatory power over reservation-
27. Id. at 220-21.
28. Id. at 223 (citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-66 (1871)).
29. Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's Indian Law Decisions: Deviations
from Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. Pa. J.
Const. L. 405, 470 (2003); Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 434 F.3d 1127, 1136-37 (9th
Cir. 2006).
30. Valencia-Weber, supra n. 29, at 416-17.
31. Id. at 418-20.
32. Mont. v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
33. Id. at 565-66.
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based causes of action arising on fee lands and involving nonmem-
ber defendants. 34 The Court allowed for two exceptions to this
rule, and for both of those the Court cited to Williams, among
others, as examples of those exceptions.35 First, the Court noted
that a tribe could have jurisdiction in a Montana scenario if the
nonmember had "enter[ed] consensual relationships with the tribe
or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements." 36 Despite the lack of qualifications to the
Williams rule, the Court interpreted the nature of the nonmem-
ber's on-reservation conduct in Williams to be legally significant-
conduct later described by the Court as actions "involv[ing] pri-
vate commercial actors."37
Second, the Court noted that a tribe could have jurisdiction in
a Montana scenario when the nonmember's "conduct threatens or
has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic se-
curity, or the health or welfare of the tribe."38 Williams arose
from a commercial debt and is cited as an example of the second
Montana exception. It is to be inferred then that nonmember
suits against tribal members for commercial debts are sufficiently
related to a tribe's interests to invoke tribal jurisdiction, even
though the Williams Court, again, did not qualify the rule it ar-
ticulated. Rather, it stated simply that the state may not "in-
fringe[ I] on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them."39
II. MONTANA V. UNITED STATES AND ITS SUCCESSORS
In 1981, Montana v. United States kick-started the judicial
trend away from the basic presumption in favor of tribal civil ju-
risdiction articulated by Williams. Williams has never been over-
turned, but, as in Montana, its meaning has been reshaped to
limit tribal sovereignty. There are two kinds of post-Montana
cases: (1) those that reject the basic Williams presumption and
create precedent that further limits inherent tribal adjudicatory
authority; and (2) those that reject the basic Williams presump-
tion and create positive precedent that attempts to resolve the
conflict between tribal and state adjudicatory authority.
34. Id. at 565-67.
35. Id. at 565-66.
36. Id. at 565.
37. Nev. v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 372 (2001).
38. Mont., 450 U.S. at 566.
39. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
216 Vol. 68
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A. Montana v. United States
Montana v. United States was a federal action brought by the
United States on behalf of the Crow Tribe.40 The United States
petitioned for declaratory judgment that the Crow Tribe and the
federal government, not the State of Montana, had the authority
to regulate hunting and fishing within the exterior boundaries of
the Crow Reservation. 41 It is significant that Montana was de-
cided just three short years after Oliphant v. Suquamish,42 a tri-
bal criminal jurisdiction case in which the Court held that tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers committing crimes on the reserva-
tion had been implicitly limited, and hence no longer existed. 43
Although Oliphant concerns criminal jurisdiction, and hence is
not good precedent for a tribal civil jurisdiction issue, the Mon-
tana Court deliberately duplicated Oliphant's reasoning:
[T]he Indian tribes retain their inherent power to determine tribal
membership, to regulate domestic relations among members, and to
prescribe rules of inheritance for members .... But exercise of tri-
bal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-govern-
ment or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the depen-
dent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express con-
gressional delegation. 44
Both Montana and Oliphant relied on the new theory of im-
plicit divestiture.45 Implicit divestiture diverges from the funda-
mental principle of Indian law that powers of inherent tribal sov-
ereignty may only be divested by an express act of Congress: 46 the
principle relied upon by the Court in Williams v. Lee to support
the presumption in favor of tribal civil adjudicatory authority for
reservation-based causes of action.47 Instead, Montana and Oli-
phant reversed that presumption, holding that absent "express
congressional delegation,"48 tribes lack power to exercise adjudica-
tory authority over nonmembers because that inherent sovereign
power has been "implicit[ly] divest[ed]" 49 by the nature of tribal
status relative to the U.S. government. 50 Thus, while the Wil-
40. Mont., 450 U.S. at 549.
41. Id.
42. Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
43. Id. at 208.
44. Mont., 450 U.S. at 564 (citation omitted).
45. Newton, supra n. 25, at 224-25.
46. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-66 (1871).
47. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
48. Mont., 450 U.S. at 564.
49. Id.; U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).
50. Mont., 450 U.S. at 564; Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
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liams rule was never explicitly overruled by succeeding cases, the
theory of implicit divestiture altered its meaning after the fact.
The result was an enormous restriction of inherent tribal adjudi-
catory authority over reservation-based causes of action. Where
Williams stood for the proposition that the Court presumes tribal
authority in civil cases unless there is essentially no impact on a
tribe's inherent right to govern within its own territory,51 since
Montana there is a presumption in favor of state jurisdiction
where the action takes place on fee land on the reservation and
the defendant is a nonmember, unless one of the two Montana ex-
ceptions applies.52
B. Strate v. A-1 Contracting53 and Nevada v. Hicks: 54
Montana's Successors Restricting Tribal
Adjudicatory Authority
Two recent cases have extended Montana's holding, further
limiting the power of tribes to adjudicate reservation-based causes
of action. Strate v. A-1 Contracting55 and Nevada v. Hicks5 6 deal
respectively with the scope of the Montana exceptions and
whether Montana applies to tribally-owned lands held in trust by
the federal government. In these cases, the Court construed the
scope of the basic premise of Montana broadly, while at the same
time construing the scope of the Montana exceptions narrowly-a
tendency that does little to promote tribal self-government.
In Strate, the Court held that neither Montana exception ap-
plied when a nonmember plaintiff sued a nonmember defendant
for injuries arising from a car accident that occurred on a state-
maintained right-of-way on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation
in North Dakota. 57 The Court ruled that Montana controlled
under the facts because no statute or treaty governed jurisdiction
(meaning state jurisdiction was presumed)58 and also because the
cause of action arose on alienated, non-Indian land rather than
tribal land held in trust by the United States. 59
51. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
52. Mont., 450 U.S. at 565-66.
53. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
54. Nev. v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
55. Strate, 520 U.S. 438.
56. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353.
57. Strate, 520 U.S. at 442-44, 457.
58. Id. at 453.
59. Id. at 456.
Vol. 68218
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The petitioners argued that the first Montana exception ap-
plied in this case because A-1 Contractors was engaged in subcon-
tract work for the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Res-
ervation at the time of the accident, which, they argued, was a
"consensual relationship[ ] with the [T]ribe[s]."60 The Court re-
viewed the fact scenarios in the three cases the Montana court
cited as examples of the first exception, and concluded that a tri-
bal landscaping subcontract was not an activity contemplated as a
consensual relationship. 61 Other than citing the decision below
for the fact that the plaintiff was not a party to the subcontract
and referring uncritically to the three illustrative cases from the
Montana decision, the Court did not analyze or explain why a
tribe's interest in self-government was not affected by a lawsuit
arising from activities relating to a business transaction between
a tribe and a nonmember subcontractor, as under the Strate facts.
The Montana Court's examples illustrating when a "consen-
sual relationship" existed are just as uncritical and unclear about
when the exception can be applied. The cited examples reveal
that a "consensual relationship" existed in two instances in which
the action arose directly from interaction between an individual
tribal member and a nonmember, and in the instances implicating
a tribe's ability to directly tax nonmembers in a business transac-
tion. 62 Neither Strate nor Montana reveals why those particular
scenarios infringe on the right of the tribe to govern itself under
the retained Williams rule, while others do not.
The United States next argued that the second Montana ex-
ception applied because negligent behavior on reservation high-
ways necessarily affected the "health or welfare of the tribe" and
its members. 63 Interestingly, the Court agreed with this asser-
tion, stating that "[u]ndoubtedly, those who drive carelessly on a
public highway running through a reservation.., surely jeopard-
ize the safety of tribal members." 64 But the Court held that this
was not enough, and instead cited Williams for the proposition
that in order to satisfy this exception the tribe's adjudicatory au-
thority must implicate "the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them."65 The Court referred to
60. Id. at 456-57.
61. Id. at 457.
62. Id.
63. Strate, 520 U.S. at 457 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Id. at 457-58.
65. Id. at 458 (internal quotation marks omitted).
2192007
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several examples from Montana showing when the second excep-
tion is applied. 66 The cited examples included where all parties to
an adoption were tribal member residents of the reservation, the
Williams scenario of a lawsuit arising from an on-reservation com-
mercial debt, and property tax cases involving non-Indian owned
livestock.67 According to the Court, the cited cases involved situa-
tions that implicated internal tribal relations and, as the Strate
fact scenario did not constitute such a case, the second exception
was not applicable. 68 Again, with little analysis, the Court con-
cluded that authority over ensuring the safety of reservation high-
ways does not implicate this right of Indians to make their own
laws, while authority over commercial debts does.
It is unclear what legally concrete, precedential conclusions
can be drawn from Strate because of the paucity of the Court's
discussion and analysis. But if the "whys" of this case are uncer-
tain, what is certain is that the Court read the Montana excep-
tions very narrowly. Instead of reading the exceptions as in keep-
ing with the long-understood principles of tribal sovereignty and
the modern policy of tribal self-determination, the Court held that
the exceptions will apply only when they match the few examples
provided by the Montana court.
The second significant recent case that limited the scope of
tribal adjudicatory power over reservation-based causes of action
is Nevada v. Hicks.69 In Hicks, a Fallon Paiute-Shoshone tribal
member living on the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Reservation in Ne-
vada brought actions in tribal court against individual state game
wardens for tortious conduct and civil rights violations in their
search of his home on tribally-owned reservation land.70 Justice
Scalia wrote the opinion in which the Court held "tribal authority
to regulate state officers in executing process related to the viola-
tion, off reservation, of state laws is not essential to tribal self-
government or internal relations-to 'the right to make laws and
be ruled by them."' 71
A significant development in Hicks is the Court's pronounce-
ment that, although Montana's rule arose from a specific fact sce-
nario occurring on "lands . . .owned in fee simple by non-Indi-
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 459.
69. Nev. v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
70. Id. at 355-57.
71. Id. at 364.
Vol. 68220
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ans,"72 the status of the land was intended to be just one non-dis-
positive factor.73 The Court broadened the Montana holding
beyond its fact scenario, and created a new rule in which state
power over reservation causes of action involving nonmembers is
always presumed, and the most significant factor is whether tribal
"[s]elf-government and internal relations"74 are at issue.
Although the state of tribal adjudicatory power over reserva-
tion-based causes of action has changed since 1959, Hicks repre-
sents a total about-face from Williams's basic presumption in
favor of tribal authority over those causes of action. Williams was
premised on the joint congressional and judicial "assumption that
the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a
reservation."75 Absent an express act of Congress to the contrary,
that power remains in the tribes unless the state action does not
infringe on "the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them."76 Throwing that fundamental Indian
law tenet to the wind, Justice Scalia in Hicks instead announced
that "[sItates' inherent jurisdiction on reservations can of course
be stripped by Congress. But with regard to the jurisdiction at
issue here that has not occurred."77 Interestingly, the Court cited
to an 1896 criminal jurisdiction case for this proposition, 78 and ig-
nored Williams completely.
Strate and Hicks reveal the existing Court's consistent bias
against the presumption in favor of tribal civil adjudicatory au-
thority. The Court viewed the Montana rule broadly, prohibiting
tribal jurisdiction in fact scenarios not implicated in the original
decision, and applied the exceptions in only the narrowest of
cases. In these two cases, the Court demonstrated its commit-
ment to limiting tribal civil adjudicatory authority wherever pos-
sible.
72. Mont. v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 547 (1981).
73. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 370.
74. Id. at 371.
75. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
76. Id.
77. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 365 (citing Draper v. U.S., 164 U.S. 240, 242-43 (1896)) (empha-
sis added) (citation omitted).
78. Draper, 164 U.S. at 241.
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C. National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe79 and
Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante:80 Montana's
Successors Creating Positive Statements
of Indian Law
Less than ten years after Montana, the Court decided two In-
dian law cases that further refined tribal civil adjudicatory au-
thority, and reaffirmed the joint congressional and judicial com-
mitment to enhancing tribal self-determination and self-govern-
ment. Neither National Farmers Union nor Iowa Mutual
retreated from Montana's holding, but their proximity in time to
Montana reveal the intended scope and purpose behind the rule
and its exceptions better than the later cases.
In National Farmers Union Insurance v. Crow Tribe,8' a mi-
nor Crow tribal member was injured by a motorcyclist on elemen-
tary school grounds on the Crow Reservation. 2 The plaintiffs
guardian brought an action against the school district in Crow
Tribal Court,8 3 and served process on the school board chairman,
who failed to notify anyone else of the suit.8 4 As a result, default
judgment was eventually entered against the school district.8 5
The defendant insurance company and the school board subse-
quently sought redress in the federal district court, which granted
a permanent injunction against the Crow Tribal Court, stating
that the Tribe lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action.8 6
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and the U. S. Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the federal dis-
trict court could enjoin a tribal court on the basis of lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.8 7
The Court held that, on these facts, tribal civil adjudicatory
authority over the non-Indian defendants was not precluded by
law, and could be determined by examining the reach of tribal sov-
ereignty-whether that sovereignty has been divested, and
whether statutes, treaties, or federal precedent impacted the ex-
tent of tribal jurisdiction.8 8 The Court established that this deter-
79. Nati. Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
80. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
81. Natl. Farmers Union Ins., 471 U.S. 845.




86. Id. at 848-49.
87. Natl. Farmers Union Ins., 471 U.S. at 847, 849.
88. Id. at 855-56.
Vol. 68222
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mination is one that must first be reached by the tribal court.8 9
Therefore, where tribal civil adjudicatory authority is at issue, a
federal court may not act until tribal remedies are exhausted. 90
The Court premised this holding on two governing judicial
policies. First, and most importantly, exhaustion of tribal reme-
dies best serves the modern federal policy of enhancing "tribal
self-government and self-determination," to which the Court and
the U. S. Congress have long demonstrated commitment. 91 Not
only does exhaustion allow the tribe to exercise its powers of self-
government, it provides an opportunity for a tribal appellate court
to examine its decision and "rectify any errors."92 In essence, the
Court suggested that even where tribal jurisdiction is lacking, ex-
haustion serves tribal self-determination because it encourages
tribal courts to learn from their mistakes by both deciding the law
and explaining that law to the parties.
Second, the Court noted that exhaustion of tribal remedies
has the effect of enhancing judicial economy because, when the
tribal court has been allowed to complete its inquiry into the basis
for its jurisdiction over the action, the result is the development of
a full record, which can be relied upon by any succeeding federal
court.93 The federal court and the parties are not then required to
visit the issues anew. Furthermore, where federal Indian law
may be a murky, unfamiliar subject to mainstream law practition-
ers and judges, the tribal record gives the federal actors the "bene-
fit of [the tribal court's] expertise in such matters in the event of
further judicial review."94
The Court's articulation of its commitment to tribal self-deter-
mination is of paramount significance in National Farmers Union.
When tribal civil adjudicatory powers are at issue, the Court
seems to say that the U. S. Congress and the federal courts are
governed by a commitment to enhancing and protecting tribes'
ability to govern themselves. The few limitations to the exhaus-
tion rule occur when the tribal action is brought in bad faith,
where jurisdiction is expressly prohibited, or when the objecting
party's opportunity to object to tribal court jurisdiction is inade-
quate.95 The National Farmers Union Court thus expressed its
89. Id. at 856.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 857.
93. Natl. Farmers Union Ins., 471 U.S. at 856.
94. Id. at 857.
95. Id. at 857 n. 21.
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respect for tribal governments and institutions, committing itself
to both protecting and strengthening tribal self-government.
Just two years later, the Court decided Iowa Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. LaPlante,96 another tort action, this time arising on
the Blackfeet Reservation in Montana, in which a tribal member
sued a nonmember insurance company in tribal court.97 Where
the National Farmers Union defendants sought the federal forum
on federal question jurisdiction, here the defendants sought the
federal forum on diversity jurisdiction. 9 They were denied at the
circuit court level based on National Farmers Union's exhaustion
rule.99 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
the extent of the exhaustion rule. 100
The Court upheld, but refined, the Ninth Circuit's ruling that
tribal remedies must be exhausted before federal jurisdiction is
allowed: exhaustion of tribal remedies is not a jurisdictional re-
quirement before the federal court may decide whether tribal civil
jurisdiction exists; rather it is matter of comity between the fed-
eral and tribal jurisdictions. 10 1
While perhaps weakening the tribal exhaustion rule, Iowa
Mutual reaffirms the judicial policy of supporting and respecting
tribal self-government. The Court noted the various ways that the
Court and Congress have encouraged tribal self-government
through the protection of tribal court jurisdiction, including fed-
eral statutes providing for the training of tribal judges, the legal
difference between divested criminal powers and retained civil
powers, and the long-held doctrine that state jurisdiction is pre-
cluded when it interferes with tribal self-government. 10 2 Tribal
remedies should be exhausted, not just respected at the trial court
level, because a commitment to self-government means that tribal
appellate courts must be allowed to review the determinations of
their lower courts.10 3 The Court stated that "[tihe federal policy of
promoting tribal self-government encompasses the development of
the entire tribal court system."10 4 Moreover, the Court rejected
96. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
97. Id. at 11.
98. Id. at 12-14.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 14.
101. Id. at 15-16, 16 n. 8.
102. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 14-15, 15 n. 6 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,
220 (1959)).
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out-of-hand the insurance company's assertion that tribal court
incompetence precluded tribal exhaustion, 0 5 because such an ex-
ception to the exhaustion rule would be "contrary to the congres-
sional policy promoting the development of tribal courts." 10 6
The cases deciding tribal civil adjudicatory authority immedi-
ately succeeding the Montana decision create positive law which,
while not expanding the scope of tribal civil jurisdiction beyond
what Montana circumscribed, reiterated the long-held judicial un-
derstanding, affirmed in Williams, that tribal sovereignty meant
tribal self-government-a worthy and compelling federal policy.
III. SMITH V. SALISH KOOTENA COLLEGE
Smith v. Salish Kootenai College (Smith II),107 an en banc de-
cision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing its own
three-judge panel decision (Smith I),108 is the most recent in this
discordant chorus of federal opinions on the scope of tribal civil
adjudicatory authority. But despite being closer in time to Strate
and Hicks, Smith If represents a philosophical return to the posi-
tive ideals embodied in Iowa Mutual and National Farmers
Union. Like those decisions, it neither expands nor diminishes
the scope of tribal civil jurisdiction from that prescribed in Mon-
tana, but reiterates the important policy foundations of tribes' ad-
judicatory authority.
The dispute in Smith arose from a single-car automobile acci-
dent occurring on the Flathead Reservation in Montana, home to
the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, in which one pas-
senger was killed and the driver and a second passenger were se-
riously injured.'0 9 The vehicle, which rolled over because of a
structural failure, was a dump truck owned by the tribal college,
Salish Kootenai College (SKC), where all three persons involved
in the accident were students. 10 Smith, an Indian enrolled in an-
other tribe, was driving as part of a college course."' Smith and
SKC were named as defendants in tort actions in tribal court, and
105. Id. at 18.
106. Id. at 19.
107. Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 434 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2006) [hereinafter Smith
Inl.
108. Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 378 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Smith
11.
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Smith cross-claimed against SKC.112 Eventually, all the claims
except for Smith's action against the college were settled, so the
tribal court realigned the parties with Smith named as plaintiff,
and SKC as the defendant. 11 3 After a tribal jury returned a ver-
dict against Smith, he asserted for the first time that the tribal
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.1 1 4 Smith took this argu-
ment to both the tribal appeals court and to the federal district
court, where he asserted an original action for negligent failure to
maintain the vehicle and spoliation of evidence.1 15 When both
courts affirmed tribal court subject matter jurisdiction, Smith ap-
pealed to the Ninth Circuit. 1 6
A three-judge panel reversed the federal district court and tri-
bal court's decisions. 11 7 The panel held that Smith was a non-
member to whom the Montana rule applied. 18 Land status was
immaterial to the decision. 19 The court did not seriously consider
that the allegedly negligent failure to maintain the vehicle would
have occurred on tribal property, because according to Hicks,
Montana applies regardless of land status. 20 Moreover, neither
Montana exception was implicated because: (1) Smith's enroll-
ment at SKC was too attenuated from his negligence claim
against the school to constitute a consensual relationship with a
tribe or tribal member;' 2 ' and (2) a "simple tort suit against a
community college" does not rise to the level of serious "im-
peril[ment of tribal] . . . political integrity . . . or the health and
welfare of the Tribe."1 22
In May 2005, the Ninth Circuit vacated that decision and
granted en banc review.' 23 The en banc court agreed that the
Montana rule applied because Smith was a nonmember, and con-
sidered two threshold factors to determine how, if at all, to apply




115. Smith 11, 434 F.3d at 1129-30.
116. Id.
117. Smith I, 378 F.3d at 1051.
118. Id. at 1052-53.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1056-57.
122. Id. at 1059.
123. Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 407 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 2005), vacating Smith I,
378 U.S. 1048.
124. Smith 11, 434 F.3d at 1131.
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the party status of the nonmember-plaintiff or defendant-be-
cause "membership status of the unconsenting party ... [is] the
primary jurisdictional fact."125  Next, the court considered
whether the cause of action arose on tribal or non-tribal land.126
Interestingly, where the three-judge panel dismissed this fact as
irrelevant under Hicks,127 the en banc court cited Hicks for the
proposition that, while it is not dispositive, land status is at least
a factor-and in this case an important one to which the Hicks
Court gave significant consideration.1 28
The en banc court examined these threshold factors at length.
Regarding party status, it was accepted that Smith was not a
member, and the court concluded that SKC was "a tribal entity,
and, for purposes of civil tribal court jurisdiction, may be treated
as though it were a tribal 'member.'"' 29 Regarding land status,
the court inquired whether Smith's tort action had a "direct con-
nection to tribal lands." 30 The court concluded that the causes of
action (negligent failure to maintain the vehicle and spoliation of
evidence) all necessarily occurred at the college-on tribal
lands.131
With those threshold questions resolved, the court moved on
to a discussion of whether either of the Montana exceptions ap-
plied, and, if so, based on party and land status, which exception
would govern. 132 The court's analysis is interesting because it
avoided the narrow interpretation of the exceptions found in
Strate and Hicks, and yet neither flouted nor rejected the holdings
in those cases; rather the court defined the Smith facts as more
complex, and thus outside the scope of those holdings.
The court noted that Hicks did not apply under these facts
because the nonmember party in Hicks did not "voluntarily sub-
mit[ I ... to tribal regulatory jurisdiction," and here, Smith volun-
tarily brought his cross-claim in tribal court.' 33 And Strate did
not apply to Smith because Strate referred to the issues of "'the
adjudicatory authority of tribal courts over personal injury actions
against defendants who are not tribal members,"' and here the
125. Id. (quoting Nev. v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 382 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring)).
126. Id.
127. Smith I, 378 F.3d at 1052.
128. Smith 11, 434 F.3d at 1131.




133. Id. at 1136 (quoting Nev. v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 372 (2001)).
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nonmember party was the plaintiff.134 Since Hicks and Strate
could not, therefore, be analogized to the facts, the court looked
elsewhere for a tribal civil jurisdiction case that best matched the
Smith facts, and from which it could determine the applicability of
the Montana exceptions. That case was Williams.135
Williams best analogized to the Smith facts first on very basic
grounds: the plaintiff in both cases was the nonmember, and the
defendant in both cases was the member. 136 More specifically,
however, the nonmember in both cases satisfied the first Montana
exception under the same circumstances because both engaged in
consensual relationships with a tribe or its members. 137 It was
immaterial that the consensual relationship in Williams was a
commercial transaction and the consensual relationship in Smith
was Smith's suit in tribal court.138 It was also immaterial to the
court that Williams predated the formulation of the Montana ex-
ceptions, because it was cited as a model for both exceptions.' 39
On first glance, this would seem out of line with Strate's nar-
row holding on the first exception, and its rejection of the tribal
subcontract as a consensual relationship.140 But since the Strate
Court failed to elaborate on why the tribal subcontract did not fit
the first exception,' 4 ' and because the Smith relationship was
nothing like a tribal subcontract, there was no legal reason why
the Smith II court couldn't conclude that Smith's suit created a
consensual relationship. Indeed, the Smith II court justified its
finding that a voluntary nonmember suit in tribal court is a con-
sensual relationship under Montana, despite its lack of commer-
cial character, because "civil tribal jurisdiction [should not] turn
on finely-wrought distinctions between contract and tort."142
Instead, the Smith II court examined the policy behind the
first exception and found that the overriding rationale for allowing
tribal jurisdiction where a nonmember is in a consensual relation-
ship with the tribe or its members is the element of choice on the
134. Smith 11, 434 F.3d at 1136 (quoting Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442
(1997)) (emphasis in Smith II).
135. Id. at 1136-37.
136. Id. at 1136.
137. Id. at 1137.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 457 (1997).
141. Id.
142. Smith 11, 434 F.3d at 1137.
228 Vol. 68
18
Montana Law Review, Vol. 68 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol68/iss1/10
TRIBAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
part of the nonmember. 14 3 According to the court, the first Mon-
tana exception is something like the due process analysis for per-
sonal jurisdiction in non-Indian civil law matters, hinging on the
meaningful contacts established by the nonmember and whether
they were purposeful. 14 Smith established a meaningful contact
with the tribe-he purposefully formed a relationship by bringing
his cross-claim in tribal court-and thus he satisfied the first
Montana exception and precluded assertion of state jurisdic-
tion. 145
IV. SELF-DETERMINATION AND TRIBAL
CIVIL ADJUDICATORY AUTHORITY
Federal jurisprudence from 1959, when the U.S. Supreme
Court decided Williams, through 2006, when the Ninth Circuit
rendered its opinion in Smith H, reveals some legal truths about
tribal adjudicatory authority over reservation-based causes of ac-
tion. The true scope of that inherent tribal power is reflected in
the monumental rise of tribal self-determination in federal Indian
law in the last quarter of the twentieth century, as well as in the
language of the Montana exceptions. Tribal self-determination
and tribal self-government have been the guiding, constant theme
throughout these tribal civil jurisdiction cases. Even Williams v.
Lee, 14 6 informed by the Indian termination era,147 framed the
boundary between tribal and state jurisdiction as one defined by
"the right of the Indians to govern themselves." 48 Williams was
decided during an era when tribal sovereignty and tribal self-gov-
ernment were so little valued in federal Indian policy that Con-
gress was willing to completely extinguish the tribal existence of
such "assimilated" tribes as the Menominee of Wisconsin. 149 Yet
Williams articulated the rule that states have no civil adjudica-
tory power over Indian reservations unless the power does not "in-
fringe[] on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them."150
143. Id. at 1138.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1140.
146. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
147. Id. at 220-21.
148. Id. at 223.
149. 25 U.S.C. §§ 891-902 (repealed 1973).
150. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
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Even Montana reaffirmed the importance of tribal self-deter-
mination and self-government. Indeed, the Court's reasoning for
prohibiting tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers on fee land was
premised on the idea that tribal jurisdiction exists to "protect tri-
bal self-government [and] to control internal relations."151 This is
likely the reason the Court formulated the second Montana excep-
tion, allowing tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers on fee land
where the nonmember's "conduct threatens or has some direct ef-
fect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health
or welfare of the tribe."152 Self-government cannot exist where
the sovereign has no power to use its laws to protect its political
integrity, its security, or the health and welfare of its citizens.
In addition, the exhaustion doctrine of National Farmers
Union and Iowa Mutual follows the commitment to tribal self-gov-
ernment established by Williams and Montana.153 As discussed
above, Smith II returned to the pro-self-determination stance first
articulated in Williams. The only cases in this series of tribal civil
jurisdiction that did not rely on the policy of Indian self-determi-
nation were Strate and Hicks, but perhaps they are anomalies.
Is it strange that National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual
were more in line with Montana's commitment to self-determina-
tion than Strate and Hicks? Likely not. The former were much
closer in time to Montana, at four and six years after respectively.
Strate and Hicks, on the other hand, were decided sixteen and
twenty years after Montana, respectively.
The two exhaustion cases perhaps had a better perspective on
the original policy and meaning behind the Montana decision if
only because of proximity in time. Moreover, Justices Thurgood
Marshall and John Paul Stevens, who authored Iowa Mutual and
National Farmers Union respectively, may have better understood
Justice Stewart's intent in Montana because both served on the
bench with him.154 Perhaps they were echoing Stewart's tribal
self-determination philosophy. It is not clear how Justice Stew-
art's understanding of the scope of tribal government was formed,
151. Mont. v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
152. Id. at 566.
153. Natl. Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985); Iowa Mut.
Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14-17 (1987).
154. The S. Ct. Historical Socy., History of the Court: Timeline of the Justices, http://
www.supremecourthistory.org/02_history/substimelinel02_a.html (accessed Apr. 1, 2006);
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but it may be revealing that his first year on the bench was
1959-the year Williams was decided. 155 Neither Justices Scalia
nor Ginsburg, authors of Hicks and Strate, ever served with the
author of the Montana decision.15 6
Self-determination should be the overriding concern when In-
dian civil jurisdiction is at issue. Self-determination is not a con-
cept that applies solely to American Indian tribes. As a legal prin-
ciple, it is most recognizably found in discussions of emerging na-
tion-states throughout the world.15 7 With origins in the French
and American Revolutions, the concept requires that "government
be responsible to the people."158 And some scholars of Indian law
have postulated that the confused mess of Indian dependence on
the government and the intertwining of jurisdictions could be
solved if the U.S. government further fostered Indian self-deter-
mination, as it did in post-World War II Europe.1 59 As such, the
United States could establish "something of a Marshall Plan for
American Indians, [which] would be offset by long-term savings in
social costs." 160 Such a project could achieve what the United
States attempted during the termination era, but instead of extin-
guishing Indian sovereignty, enhancing it to terminate Indian re-
liance on the federal government.
The Court used self-determination principles to justify ex-
haustion of tribal remedies, encouraging tribes' exercise of power
over reservation-based causes of action, avoiding needless bur-
dens on state and federal governments.' 16 The Court was not say-
ing two different things when it justified tribal exhaustion both on
tribal self-determination grounds and judicial economy grounds.
Tribal self-determination, when tribal civil adjudicatory powers
are at issue, necessarily means judicial economy for state and fed-
155. The S. Ct. Historical Socy., History of the Court: Timeline of the Justices, http:/!
www.supremecourthistory.org/02_history/subs-.timeline02-a.html (accessed Apr. 1, 2006);
Williams, 358 U.S. 217.
156. The S. Ct. Historical Socy., History of the Court: The Current Court -Antonin
Scalia, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/02_history/subs-currentimages-b/002.html
(accessed Apr. 1, 2006); The S. Ct. Historical Socy., History of the Court: The Current Court
- Ruth Bader Ginsburg, http'//www.supremecourthistory.org/02_history/subs-currentl
imagesb/006.html (accessed Apr. 1, 2006).
157. See Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cam-
bridge U. Press 1995).
158. Id. at 11.
159. Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz, Indians of the Americas: Human Rights and Self-Determi-
nation 178 (Praeger 1984).
160. Id.
161. See Natl. Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985); Iowa Mut.
Ins. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14-17 (1987).
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eral governments. Where tribes have the power and ability to ad-
judicate reservation-based causes of action, it logically follows
that the burden on the non-Indian forum will be lessened,
whether by keeping the dispute out of the non-Indian courts alto-
gether, or producing a judicial record which, by comity, allows the
non-Indian forum to rely on the tribal court's findings of fact or its
expertise in federal Indian law.
Furthermore, the great body of Indian law, which has con-
founded and frustrated legal practitioners since Chief Justice
Marshall's time, could be greatly streamlined and simplified by
reasserting inherent tribal adjudicatory authority over reserva-
tion-based causes of action. At present, there are three jurisdic-
tional forces making law and interpreting treaties and statutes
relating to Indian affairs. The decisions of state courts, federal
courts, and tribal courts on the same issues of Indian law are, at
best, slightly out of sync with each other.
Take for instance a recent decision of the Montana Supreme
Court deciding whether a certified Indian-owned business may be
considered a member of an Indian tribe in order to invoke one of
the Montana exceptions. 162 In Zempel v. Liberty, a tavern owned
by a tribal member, located on the Flathead Indian reservation,
and certified as an Indian-owned business by the Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes, was named as a defendant in an ac-
tion arising from a drunken driving accident brought by a non-
member plaintiff.163 The defendant tavern asserted that its In-
dian-owned business status made it a tribal member such that the
Montana exceptions should be applied.164 The Montana Supreme
Court arrived at its conclusion in a way that follows the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Smith H, interpreting the same federal prece-
dent that would be relied upon in federal or tribal court.' 65 But it
created new Montana state precedent on tribal membership of cor-
porations for Montana exception purposes166-an issue that has
not yet been addressed by the Ninth Circuit. So Montana practi-
tioners litigating a similar issue must take into consideration par-
allel precedent, which while not contradictory, is not in sync with
the body of federal law on tribal civil adjudicatory authority. This,
it should be noted, is probably a relatively benign example of what
162. Zempel v. Liberty, 143 P.3d 123, 127, 132 (Mont. 2006).
163. Id. at 126-27.
164. Id. at 132.
165. Id. at 130-34.
166. Id. at 132.
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can happen when several jurisdictions decide the same issue of
federal Indian law under different fact scenarios and without in-
teracting. The reassertion of presumed, inherent tribal civil adju-
dicatory authority over reservation-based causes of action would
likely limit such inconsistencies between federal and state law.
V. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF TRIBAL CIVIL ADJUDICATORY
AUTHORITY OVER RESERVATION-BASED CAUSES OF ACTION
Only by act of Congress or decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
will the reinsertion of self-determination principles into the dis-
cussion of tribal civil adjudicatory authority, and the reassertion
of inherent tribal civil adjudicatory authority over reservation-
based causes be achieved. Both scenarios are possible.
Strate and Hicks were aberrations, out of line with the true
meaning and scope of tribal civil jurisdiction jurisprudence in fed-
eral court. Those cases' interpretations of Williams and Montana
were anomalous errors, and their exclusion of self-determination
and self-government as primary principles behind tribal civil ju-
risdiction were mistakes that ought to be corrected. Although the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Smith If is less persuasive than the
Supreme Court's decisions in Strate and Hicks, it reveals that
Strate and Hicks may be so far afield from the true meaning of
tribal civil jurisdiction that a court can reasonably and legally de-
cide such an issue within Montana's constraints without running
afoul of either of those decisions.
While it does not reveal how the U.S. Supreme Court might
evaluate future tribal civil jurisdiction cases, in June of 2006, the
Court denied Smith's petition for certiorari, and let stand the
Ninth Circuit's judgment. 167 At the very least, this denial of certi-
orari demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit's commitment to self-
determination in a tribal civil jurisdiction analysis was not contra-
dictory to current law.
However, it is not clear that the current Supreme Court is
poised to move back toward Williams and greater respect for tri-
bal self-determination. But even absent a willing Court, the U.S.
Congress exercises plenary power over Indian affairs. 168 In re-
sponse to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Duro v. Reina, in
which the Court held that tribes have no criminal adjudicatory
powers over nonmember Indians committing on-reservations
167. Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 126 S. Ct. 2893 (2006).
168. See e.g. U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-85 (1886).
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crimes, 169 Congress, recognizing a jurisdictional void created by
the Duro decision, 170 enacted the "Duro fix." This amendment to
the Indian Civil Rights Act relaxed Duro's judicial restriction of
tribal sovereign powers, and reaffirmed tribal adjudicatory au-
thority over nonmember Indians. 171
In U.S. v. Lara, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the ability
of Congress to redefine the metes and bounds of tribal sover-
eignty, essentially without limitation, upholding the Duro fix.1 72
If a new Congress can be convinced, as the Williams, Montana,
National Farmers Union, and Iowa Mutual Courts were, that self-
determination is the most advantageous and consistent policy con-
sideration behind defining the scope of tribal civil adjudicatory au-
thority, then it is possible that tribes could regain a significant
measure of their inherent power over on-reservation civil matters.
Such a statute (a civil Duro fix) could bring the United States and
tribes closer to a realization of self-determination, which would
enhance tribal sovereignty, lessen the tribal burden on the United
States and create greater consistency in the interpretation of In-
dian law.
169. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 692 (1990).
170. Id. at 697-98.
171. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000).
172. U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199-200 (2004).
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